




Thecasesolution.com

# ENRON®



**Account for demand**  
Enron's demand for electricity is a key factor in its business. The company's demand is highly volatile and is subject to significant fluctuations. This volatility is a result of the company's operations in the energy market, which are highly competitive and subject to significant price fluctuations.

**Downfall**  
Enron's downfall was caused by a combination of factors, including the company's aggressive accounting practices, its reliance on derivatives, and its involvement in the Enron scandal. The company's financial statements were found to be misleading, and its operations were found to be highly risky and speculative.

**Enron's**  
Enron's operations were highly complex and involved a wide range of financial instruments and derivatives. The company's operations were highly volatile and subject to significant fluctuations in price and demand.

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

**Merchant model**  
Enron's merchant model was a key factor in its success. The company's merchant model allowed it to generate significant profits from its operations in the energy market. The merchant model was highly volatile and subject to significant fluctuations in price and demand.

## Endless possibilities.™


# Enron Profile

## Revenues (\$ Billions)

## Assets (\$ Billions)



Revenues (\$ Billions)



# Merchant model

Entire value of each trade is recorded as revenue

As apposed to the "agent model" where only brokerage fees are reported as revenue

# Reasons for downfall

## Mark-to-market accounting

Mark-to-market accounting requires future income to be estimated at current market value once a long-term contract is signed. Accounts' net cash flows are hard to estimate, so estimates were often viable. Investors were given misleading information to account for the discrepancy between profits and cash.

## Special purpose entities

JEDI

In 1993 Enron and CalPERS entered a joint venture called Joint Energy Development Investments. In 1997 COO, Jeffrey Skilling, asked CalPERS to enter another investment venture with Enron. CalPERS agreed on the condition that it would terminate as partner in JEDI. In order to hide the debt created in this business transaction CFO, Andrew Fastow, created Chewco LP, which raised debt gained by Enron and acquired CalPERS's joint venture stake; this kept JEDI's losses off of Enron's balanced earnings report.

Chewco

Whitewing

In 1997 Enron created Whitewing, an investment vehicle that was funded 50% by Enron (50% by private investors) to buy Enron's assets. The entity's charter was then altered so it could no longer be included on Enron balance sheets. Whitewing then purchased Enron's assets using Enron's stocks as collateral. By 2001 Whitewing owned \$2 billion in Enron assets.

LJM

In 1999 CFO, Fastow, created LJM1 and LJM2 as private equity investors to invest in Enron's special purpose entities. Enron invested in LJM1 itself while investment firms, like: Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, and J.P. Morgan Chase provided nearly \$420 million in investments to LJM2.

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