








No Table (CSTO, Molt oblief Platform Strateg





Introduction

Thecasesolutions.com

"[...] seeks to explain strategic pricing behavior and product design decisions in network markets."

- 1. How is it possible that firms are willing to subsidize information and related products, apparently expecting neither future consumer exploitation nor tying?
 - 2. Why do firms give away applications development toolkits, portable document readers, and Internet browsers without metering tie-ins to those same consumers?

A: "network effects"

Historical Context & Literature Review

+/- Network Externalities: the effects on a user of a product or service
of others using the same or compatible products or services. (utility,
bandwagon effect)



VS.



• "2-sided" network externality: crosses markets from developers to consumers.

One sided network effects are possible

Multiproduct Pricing

- Lowering price of one half of a "matched pair" sells more of the other.
- A product design strategy that discounts price to zero depends on several things:
 - 1. low marginal costs
 - 2. unique properties of information
 - ~increased consumption of information = increased attractiveness.

Markets

Who really benefits from discounted/free products in a two-sided network?

Two parties: 1.) the intended 2.) "there for the ride"

Example: Ladies night! → free product/promo

- intended to attract men as they pay full price
- · women benefit as they have free/discounted admission



🗥 WARNING: MATH UP AHEAD 🗥


















Refresh & rewind: Econ 101




Thecasesolutions.com





Two-sided Market



Network Effects


Cross-side

Same-Side


Companies want to Ш advertise on FB because wide consumer base.



Fellow gamers want friends to have the same system to play together.




More Ads Less Viewers



Too many companies trying to advertise on radio/tv, customers will change channel.

Ш

More Seller Competition



Exclusive/private clubs lose value as people join.

IV